Research on Green Supply Chain Game Models under Different Contracts

Abstract

Faced with of increasingly severe environmental problems, consumers’ green preference has become a key market drivers in promoting environmental sustainability of supply chains. This paper establishes a two-echelon supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, the impact of carbon tax and product greenness is considered. By introducing different contracts to study their impact on green supply chains, we resolve the revenue-sharing contract model, the decentralized decision-making model and the cost-sharing contract model respectively, followed by a further comparison of three game models. Since the centralized control model is difficult to be realized in practical application, we exclude the centralized control model from the research framework. The analytical results indicate that coordinating contracts, referring to the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract, it can effectively raise the revenue of the entire green supply chain and the green level of products. Meanwhile, both the manufacturer and retailer can obtain higher revenue. Therefore, revenue-sharing contract is an optimization mechanism to increase the overall revenue of the green supply chain (GSC) and itsmembers involved. Additionally, both the cost-sharing contractand revenue-sharing contractare effective inpromoting cooperation of participants in the green supply chain. The results and findings in the paper provide significant implications for the implement and development of the green supply chain, which also contribute to further study on the contract design, revenue distribution and incentive mechanisms for the green supply chain management.